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ABSTRACT
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to discuss the response of European energy commodity prices to unexpected monetary policy surprises from 
the European Central Bank (ECB). Using the Rigobon (2003) identification through heteroscedasticity method, we find a significant and positive 
response during the crisis period for Brent and coal. Similar results are obtained by other authors for European financial assets in this period. This 
result reinforces the idea that during this period, financial assets and some commodities positively responded to conventional and unconventional 
expansionary monetary policy measures, increasing confidence about the survival of the European monetary union. The remaining European energy 
commodities (electricity, EUAs, and natural gas prices) seem to be unaffected by monetary policy actions. We think these results are of interest to those 
economic agents and institutions involved in European energy markets and are especially important for the ECB in order to predict the consequences 
of its monetary policy on the inflation objective.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we estimate how European energy prices react to 
unexpected changes in European Central Bank (ECB henceforth) 
monetary policy. This topic has been extensively studied in the US, 
but this type of study is very scarce in Europe. “Since commodity 
prices help determine a wide range of consumer and producer 
prices, the response of commodity prices to monetary policy 
is an important aspect of monetary transmission mechanism,” 
(Scrimgeour, 2015. p. 88). This is especially true for the ECB as 
its main objective is price stability. For monetary policymakers, 
this topic is important as they wish to anticipate the response of 
asset prices to their conventional or unconventional monetary 
policy actions. The main objective of the ECB is to control price 
inflation and one of the most important components of inflation 
is the price of energy.1 Furthermore, oil price changes and market 
measures of inflation expectations are highly and positively 
correlated since the financial crisis and appear to be very high 
1 In Choi et al. (2017) it is found that for the period 1970–2015, a 10% 
increase in global oil inflation increases, on average, domestic inflation by 
about a 0.4% point in a sample of 72 advanced and developing economies. 
This impact has decreased over the years. In Álvarez et al. (2011) and for 
the Euro zone, the impact of such an oil price increase on inflation is rated 
0.17 for the period 1999–2008.
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over the last few years (Confitti and Cristadoro, 2018). Financial 
market participants will follow with great attention central bank 
monetary policy decisions. The integration of commodity markets 
in the financial markets in the early 2000s make these assets more 
responsive to financial market surprises (Basak and Pavlova, 
2016). Consequently, financial agents and institutions will also be 
interested in the responsiveness of their commodity portfolio to 
monetary policy actions before any investment or risk management 
decision is made.
Estimating the response of energy prices to monetary policy 
surprises is difficult because of the endogeneity of interest rates. 
Conventional monetary policy stance is steered by moving the 
policy rate. Obviously, short term interest rates will respond to 
unexpected changes in the policy rate, but also by movements in 
asset prices and this produces a difficult problem of endogeneity. 
Rigobon (2003) proposes a new methodology to solve the 
identification in simultaneous-equation models based on the 
heteroscedasticity in high-frequency data. This methodology 
was originally applied to measure the impact of monetary policy 
surprises on asset prices by Rigobon and Sack (2004). Scrimgeour 
(2015) applied this methodology to US commodity prices. The 
main assumption is that the variance of monetary policy shocks 
is higher on days the ECB governing council meets. On such 
meeting days, the shift in the variance of short term interest 
rates and its covariance with commodity prices is sufficient to 
measure the responsiveness of energy prices to monetary policy 
surprises. Using daily frequency, Scrimgeour (2015) found that a 
100 basis-point increase in interest rates would cause commodity 
prices to fall 6% for the period 1994 until March 2008. The result 
is similar for oil but less precise. Furthermore, results are quite 
similar and consistent with the high frequency data of Basistha 
and Kurov (2015).
The most popular alternative to the Rigobon and Sack (2004) 
approach is the “event-study” method. In this method, the 
endogeneity problem of interest rates is reduced by using high 
frequency data embedded with the announcement timing. During 
this specific short period of time, any shock in asset prices can 
be assumed to be a response to the unexpected monetary policy 
actions and an ordinary least square regression can be a valid tool to 
measure the relationship between asset prices and monetary policy 
surprises. There are some insightful papers using the event-study 
approach with high-frequency data.2 For example, in the period 
preceding the financial crisis, Conrad and Lamla (2010) find a 
significant effect on the EUR-USD exchange rate in the 30 min 
following the ECB press release. Unexpected tightening/easing of 
monetary policy leads to an immediate appreciation/depreciation 
of the euro against the US dollar. The authors argue that as price 
stability is the ECB’s main objective, a communication on rising 
future inflation induces an appreciation of the euro because of the 
expected rise of future market rates.
As this paper deals with the relationship between monetary 
policy actions and energy commodity prices, it is important to 
2 Insightful recent references for this approach are Conrad and Lamla (2012), 
Rogers et al. (2014), Basistha and Kurov (2015), Rosa (2014) and Haitsma 
et al. (2016).
describe how unexpected interest rate movements can influence 
energy prices. An unexpected increase (decrease) in interest rates 
will increase (reduce) the carry costs and increase (reduce) the 
incentive for extraction sooner rather than later – and so lead 
to higher (lower) supply of commodities and lower (higher) 
commodity prices. Furthermore, considering energy commodities 
as financial assets, an unexpected reduction in interest rates 
will increase the levels of quality fly trading by investors and 
speculators in commodities: Moving from the fixed income market 
to commodity markets in search of higher returns. Therefore, after 
a policy monetary surprise that increases interest rates, a decrease 
in commodity prices should be expected if commodities are 
seen as assets like bonds or stocks. Likewise, after an expansive 
non-conventional monetary policy announcement, oil prices are 
expected to increase.3
There is a controversy about the permanent or transitory nature 
of the response of asset prices to monetary policy actions. Chan 
and Gray (2017) agree and extend the work of Kilian and Vega 
(2011) in studying future energy price jumps in response to 
macroeconomic announcements. They found little evidence of an 
increase in jump arrival rates coinciding with scheduled releases 
of economic data. This result is evidence in favour of taking the 
crude oil price as predetermined (and so it cannot be regarded 
as an asset). In contrast, Basistha and Kurow (2015) and Rosa 
(2014) found a significant intraday response of energy prices 
to monetary policy surprises. This controversial finding seems 
to agree with the idea that the response disappears at the end of 
the day and is transitory rather than permanent Kilian and Vega 
(2011), Rosa (2014), and Basistha and Kurow (2015). But for 
other financial assets, Basistha and Kurow (2015) find that the 
effect remains significant at the end of the day. Using several 
VAR specifications, Basistha and Kurov (2015) conclude that the 
accumulated response for 5 and 20 days are small and imprecise. 
Only a significant response on energy returns on the same day is 
found for unscheduled target surprises computed with intraday 
data. With monthly data, their results provide support for the 
assumption of predetermined oil prices as no response is found.
The analysis of the asset price reaction to central bank monetary 
policy measures has become more difficult after the 2007 
crisis because of the rapid depletion of conventional monetary 
policies based on interest rate cuts that turned negative at various 
maturities and the successive implementation of unconventional 
expansionary monetary policies known as quantitative easing. 
The unconventional ECB monetary policy actions did have 
the opposite effect on financial assets than in other monetary 
areas during the crisis period. Rogers et al. (2014) found that 
expansionary monetary surprises led the euro to appreciate and 
the German bond and Eurozone corporate bonds to rise – and a 
contrarian response was observed in peripheral bonds (Italian and 
Spanish). These authors argue that these sometimes audacious 
actions lessened safe-haven flows into bunds and promoted 
financial stability and confidence in the survival of the European 
monetary union. ECB actions during this period were aimed at 
reducing intra-Eurozone sovereign spreads. Therefore, these 
spreads can be considered an important part of the transmission 
3 Chan and Gray (2017) and Basistha and Kuron (2015).
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mechanism for monetary policy during the financial crisis. These 
results are very important for explaining energy commodity 
responses to ECB surprises during the crisis period, and this is 
especially true in the Brent oil case.
Our results show that Brent oil returns are positively related with 
unexpected shocks in interest rates on the governing council 
meeting days during the crisis period. That is, expansive non-
conventional monetary policy announcements led Brent oil 
to rise, probably as a result of an increase in confidence in an 
earlier economic recovery, and also because financialisation of 
the commodity markets makes Brent respond in the same way 
as stocks and high quality bonds. Eser and Schwaab (2016) have 
found that weekly Security Marque Programme (SMP) purchase 
amounts have no effect on the Overnight Interest Swaps (OIS) rates 
and government bond yields for non-stressed euro area countries, 
and therefore, these authors accept that the SMP does not signal 
information about future low monetary policy rates. The largest 
purchase occurred after the introduction of the SMP on 10 May 
and after its reactivation on 8 August 2011. On these dates, the 
OIS rates and sovereign bond yields of countries not included 
in the SMP were almost unaffected. Therefore, following this 
evidence, we decided not to extend our analysis to consider the 
SMP purchase amounts.
2. ESTIMATION FRAMEWORK
When the effects of monetary policy surprises on energy prices 
are estimated using interest rates, two important problems 
appear. Firstly, many omitted variables probably influence both 
asset prices and short-term interest rates (such as variables that 
provide information about the macroeconomic outlook or changes 
in risk preferences).4 Secondly, the existence of endogeneity 
in the relationship between both variables, that is, asset prices 
are influenced by short-term interest rates, but the short-term 
interest rate is simultaneously affected by asset prices (primarily 
through their influence on monetary policy expectations).5 The 
conventional monetary transmission mechanism works correctly 
when the yield curve closely reflects market expectations about 
the future path of the central bank monetary policy stance. Energy 
prices are influenced by short-term interest rates, but interest rates 
are also influenced by energy prices – one of the most important 
determinants of inflation rates – and the main aim of the ECB is 
price stability.
The intuition of the identification through heteroscedasticity 
method proposed by Rigobon (2003) is based on splitting the 
sample in two subsamples (pre-event and event days) of the same 
size and assuming that the covariance between interest rates and 
commodities is higher on the days of policy shock increases. As 
other forces may move interest rates and commodity prices on 
event days, Rigobon and Sack (2004) use instrumental variables 
built on non-event days to provide information about the typical 
relationship between interest rates and commodity prices.6 They 
4 Chan and Gray (2016).
5 Rigobon and Sack (2004).
6 Other papers using this methodology are: Rogers et al. (2014), Gilchrist and 
Zakrajsek (2013), Arai (2013), Haitsma et al. (2016) and Wright (2012).  
interpret any deviation from this normal relationship on event days 
as being due to monetary policy surprises.
Consider estimating β in
 Δpt=βΔit+ϵt (1)
 Δit=mpt+νt (2)
Where mp is the monetary policy surprise which is zero in 
non-event days and may be non-zero on event days. Δpt and Δit 
represent unexpected variations in asset prices and interest rates. 
Endogeneity problems arise because interest rates move for many 
reasons, even on event days, and these reasons may be related to 
other factors that affect commodity prices (ϵt). The shock νt may 
be correlated with ϵt causing Δit to be endogenous, even on event 
days. On event days, the variance covariance matrix of [Δit, Δpt]’ 
changes in a way that enables us to identify β.
The instrumental variable proposed in Rigobon and Sack (2004) 
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The equation (1) is then estimated using all the event days and 
the days immediately prior to an event day (so the event days 
are half of the sample). Rigobon and Sacks (2004) show that the 
instrumental variable estimator is consistent.7 Rogers et al. (2014) 
and Haitsma et al. (2016) analyse the effects on financial asset 
prices of ECB unconventional monetary policy surprises during 
the crisis period. With unconventional monetary policy, there is no 
clear indicator of monetary authority policy stance, and therefore, 
it is not easy to determine policy expectations and unexpected 
shocks. Under normal circumstances monetary easing will increase 
asset prices, but in times of crisis it may be understood that future 
economic conditions are worse than expected, and consequently, 
asset prices may decrease. ECB actions during the crisis period 
were clearly aimed at intra-Eurozone sovereign spreads. These 
polices are effective in reducing sovereign risk premiums as 
interest rate are stuck at the zero lower bound. Because of this 
evidence, we will repeat all the analysis for the crisis period, but 
using the 10-year Italian risk premium on the German Bund as 
instrumental variable. Similar to Rogers et al. (2014) the policy 
surprise for the European case will be measured as the change in 
this risk premium.
The most popular alternative to our approach is the “event-
study” method as we have said in the introduction. This method 
uses high frequency data to reduce the endogeneity problem, 
encrusting the unexpected interest rate and asset prices responses 
in the time schedule of the central bank press release. During this 
specific short period of time, any shock in asset prices can be 
7 Ordinary least squares estimator in the event-study approach is biased and 
underestimates the asset price response to unexpected monetary policy 
shocks. This bias asymptotically disappears when the Rigobon and Sack 
(2004) identification through heteroscedasticity technique is used.
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assumed to be a response to unexpected monetary policy actions 
and an ordinary least square regression can be a valid tool for 
measuring the relationship between asset prices and monetary 
policy surprises. Rigobon and Sack (2004) show that the event-
study approach is an extreme case of the heteroscedasticity-based 
estimator they propose. Consequently, given that the event-study 
approach requires stronger assumptions, the heteroskedastic-based 
estimator can be used to check if any bias remains in the event-
study approach estimates. Theoretically, this method requires the 
variance of the policy shocks on interest rates to become infinitely 
large relative to the variance of the other shocks, otherwise 
some bias will remain. In contrast, identification based on 
heteroscedasticity relies on the change in the covariance of interest 
rates and energy prices when the variance of the policy shocks 
increases. Furthermore, the assumption that monetary policy 
surprise can be directly measured from jumps in interest rates, or 
bond yields, in an intraday window around the announcement time 
may be questionable. This is especially true when announcements 
are complicated and take time to digest (Rogers et al., 2014). 
There are other insightful papers using the event-study approach 
with high-frequency data. For the period preceding the financial 
crisis, Conrad and Lamla (2010) find a significant effect on the 
EUR-USD exchange rate in the 30 min following the publication of 
an ECB press release. Unexpected tightening/easing of monetary 
policy leads to an immediate appreciation/depreciation of the euro 
against the US dollar. The authors argue that as price stability is the 
ECB’s main objective, a communication on rising future inflation 
induces an appreciation of the euro because of the expected rise 
in future market rates.
For the case of Brent oil and the UK natural gas, it is important to 
test if the response of these commodities to policy shocks is due 
to simultaneous changes in the exchange rates.8 If oil and natural 
gas prices expressed in euros are unaffected by monetary policy 
surprises, then when the exchange rates increase (decrease) the 
commodities prices must increase (decrease) in their original 
currency. Similarly to Scrimgeour (2015), we will check the 
influence of the exchange rate in the commodity price response 
by testing equality in the response to policy surprises on exchange 
rates and commodity prices. Specifically, the following two 
equations will be estimated
 Δpt=βpΔit+ϵt (4)
 Δet=βeΔit+νt (5)
Where e represents the exchange rate. If the commodity expressed 
in EUR is unaffected by unexpected increases in the ECB policy 
rate, this may be explained because the increase in the exchange 
rate EUR-USD or EUR-GBP compensates the increase in the 
commodity price in USD or GBP. Then, by testing the following 
null hypothesis.
 H0:βp=βe (6)
8 Brent oil is quoted in USD and the exchange rate EUR-USD is quoted in 
USDs per one unit of EUR. Therefore, the Brent oil price can be expressed 
in EUR once the Brent oil price is divided by the EUR-USD exchange rate. 
UK natural gas is the same case but with GBP.
We will verify if the commodity price response to policy surprises 
comes through the exchange rate effect in the case of Brent oil 
and UK natural gas. Equations (4) and (5) will be estimated using 
instrumental variables as in equation (1). In this case, the test 
proposed in equation (6) will be carried out using the Hausman 
(1978) test. Equations (4) and (5) will also be estimated on event 
days using linear regression (with intercepts to avoid introducing 
a bias in the estimation) consistently estimated as in White (1980) 
to allow for heteroscedasticity. In this case, the null hypothesis in 
(6) is contrasted using a Wald test.
3. DATA AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
To identify all the event days, we include all the days in which 
an ECB press release related to monetary policy was issued. This 
collection of days includes scheduled and unscheduled meetings 
and special announcements, as the unconventional measures taken 
by the ECB in recent years did not always correspond to regular 
announcement dates. We used all the press releases issued by the 
ECB even when there was no change in monetary policy as in 
Haitsma et al. (2016). For the period 4 January 1999 until 11 April 
2017 we identified a total of 246 event days. Following Drudi et 
al. (2012) and Cassola et al. (2010), the crisis period started in 
August 2007 contains 108 ECB monetary policy decision days.
Some papers use interest rate futures changes to measure short-
term interest response to policy surprises.9 Similarly, we use 
the 3-month OIS rates. The OIS rates have become the main 
reference in the European monetary market for measuring market 
perceptions about ECB monetary policy. The use of the OIS instead 
of a forward rate on the meeting day to measure unexpected 
response to policy actions, has some advantages as it reduces the 
influence of timing shocks – and instead picks up surprises about 
the level of the expected EONIA rate over the coming 3 months.
Daily time series for the 3-month OIS rates, exchange rates (EUR-
USD and EUR-GBP), 10-year bond yields (Italian and German) 
and front futures prices on Brent, EUAs, natural gas (NBP and 
title transfer facility [TTF]), coal (ARA and RB), and electricity 
(Phelix and Endex) were extracted from Reuters.10 Logarithmic 
time series returns were obtained for all the assets – but for interest 
rates and the Italian risk-premium we used realised returns in basis 
points instead of log-returns.
As we have said in the previous section, Equations (1) and (2) cannot be 
estimated consistently using OLS due to the presence of simultaneous 
9 For example, Rigobon and Sack (2004) use the eurodollar futures contract, 
Rosa (2014) uses the federal funds futures and euribor futures are used in 
Haitsma et al. (2016).
10 The references for natural gas are the futures contracts traded at The ICE on 
the TTF hub in Netherlands and the National Balancing Point hub (NBP) in 
the UK. The reference for CO2 emissions permits are the European Union 
Allowances futures contract traded at The ICE with maturity in December 
of each year. The Euro Coal ARA Futures and Euro Coal RB Futures traded 
at the European Energy Exchange (EEX) are used as references for coal. 
The Physical Electricity Index (Phelix) refers to the base load (Phelix Base) 
price index published daily on the power spot market for the German/
Austrian market area and its futures are traded at the EEX. Similarly, 
futures negotiated in ICE ENDEX are taken for Dutch electricity.
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is higher than other times, the pattern of realised observations would 
then shift to move more closely during the asset price reaction. That 
shift in the co-movement of interest rates and asset prices on the event 
days is the basis for the identification. Figures 1 and 2 display Brent 
and 3-month OIS rate returns on policy dates and the previous day, 
respectively. From a casual comparison between both scatter plots we 
can infer that the identification through heteroscedasticity proposed 
by Rigobon (2003) seems to fit correctly with the hypothesis of the 
method – as more dispersion in the collection points is observed in 
event days. We do not observe a visual negative relationship on event 
days as Scrimgeour (2015) finds for US commodities.
Figure 3 reports the evolution of Brent prices and the 3-month 
OIS rates. In July 2008, the Brent price reached its highest values. 
Explanations for why commodity prices were high included 
growing demand in China and speculative behaviour in financial 
markets (Scrimgeour, 2015). After July 2008 “the 2008 Oil Bubble” 
burst (Tokic, 2010) and after September 2008 the ECB started to cut 
its policy rates as a consequence of the financial crisis. We observe 
similar patterns on most energy futures included in our data set.
Table 1 Panels A, B and C, report variances, covariances of asset 
returns with interest rates, and covariances of asset prices with the 
Italian risk premium, respectively. In these tables, results for Brent 
and UK natural gas are obtained for the original currency and in 
euros, once they are converted using the corresponding exchange 
rate. Some insights are now summarised. Interest rate volatility 
doubles on meeting days in the three periods (total period, pre-
crisis period, and crisis period). Italian-risk premium volatility 
increases about 17% for the crisis period on event days. In the 
remaining commodities, we do not find a clear pattern in Table 
1, Panel A. Conversely, in Panel B we observe that covariance 
of assets with the interest rate for Brent and EUAs increases on 
event days. Covariance with the remaining assets clearly increases 
in absolute values for the remaining commodities – with the 
exception of electricity. In Panel C, covariances, in absolute values, 
with the Italian risk premium in the crisis period, increase for all the 
Figure 1: Brent and Overnight Interest Swaps -month OIS rate returns 
on policy dates
Figure 2: Brent and 3-month OIS rate returns the previous day to 
policy dates
Figure 3: Brent prices and 3-month OIS rates
equations and omitted variables. Nevertheless, as Rigobon and Sack 
(2003) describes, if on the event days the variance of the policy shocks 
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commodities on event days with the exception of the ARA coal. We 
can conclude for our preliminary analysis that energy commodity 
seems to react to monetary policy actions in the crisis period. In 
contrast, for the pre-crisis period the evidence is in favour of taking 
European energy commodity prices as predetermined and so they 
cannot be regarded as an investment asset.
The identification through heteroscedasticity approach requires 
change in the covariance between interest rates (or Italian risk 
premium) and asset price increases as the variance of policy 
shock changes (Rigobon and Sack, 2003). Results in Table 1 
enable us to apply this method with confidence for the crisis 
period.
The total period runs from January 1999 to March 2017. The crisis 
period corresponds to August 2007 to March 2017. The event 
sample corresponds to the 246 announcements of the ECB related 
to the monetary policy. The pre-event sample corresponds to the 
sample of the day prior to each announcement.
4. RESULTS
Tables 2-4 present the main results of this research for Brent, 
natural gas in UK, and the remaining energy commodities (natural 
gas, EUAs, coal and electricity) in the Eurozone, respectively. 
In Table 2, three panels are reported. In Panel A, Equation (1) 
is estimated expressing its price both in USD and EUR. We find 
in both cases a similar, positive, and significant response in the 
crisis period. Specifically, using the Rigobon and Sack (2004) 
estimation method, we find that an increase in the 3-month OIS 
rate of 100 basis point would imply an increase in the oil Brent 
futures of 16.216%. The Brent price expressed in euros obtains 
Panel B: Covariance with the Eonia 3 m
Whole period Pre-crisis period Crisis period
Pre-event Event Pre-event Event Pre-event Event
Italian-premium - - - - −0.90 −6.03
Brent (USD) 0.08 1.98 −0.28 1.10 0.54 3.09
Brent (EUR) −0.10 1.87 −0.58 1.08 0.50 2.91
USD-EUR 0.15 0.08 0.24 −0.02 0.05 0.21
NBP (GBP) −0.24 −0.26 −0.36 −0.47 −0.07 0.00
NBP (EUR) −0.33 −0.35 −0.55 −0.46 −0.04 −0.22
GBP-EUR 0.06 0.04 0.16 −0.10 −0.07 0.22
TTF −0.13 −0.41 −0.95 −0.59 0.12 −0.36
EUAs −0.33 0.46 −1.55 0.69 −0.06 0.38
ARA - - - - −0.69 1.72
RB - - - - −0.44 1.94
Phelix 0.15 0.29 −0.26 0.53 0.38 0.14
ENDEX 0.21 −0.04 0.03 −0.41 0.28 0.11
Panel C: Covariance with the Italian risk premium
Crisis period
Pre-event Event
Brent (USD) −3.89 −4.85
Brent (EUR) −2.42 −3.54
USD-EUR −1.48 −1.16
NBP (GBP) −2.35 3.28








Table 1: Panel A: Variances and covariances
Whole period Pre-crisis period Crisis period
Pre-event Event Pre-event Event Pre-event Event
Eonia - 3 m 2.45 4.95 2.81 5.36 1.93 4.41
Italian-premium - - - - 9.05 10.77
Brent (USD) 2.43 2.36 2.71 2.18 2.02 2.57
Brent (EUR) 2.40 2.38 2.70 2.31 1.97 2.46
USD-EUR 0.62 0.58 0.70 0.58 0.50 0.59
NBP (GBP) 3.13 3.35 3.83 4.02 1.90 2.24
NBP (EUR) 3.21 3.39 3.91 4.04 1.99 2.35
GBP-EUR 0.54 0.47 0.58 0.45 0.48 0.48
TTF 3.63 2.61 5.76 3.81 2.35 2.00
EUAs 4.76 4.40 5.39 7.28 4.62 3.43
ARA - - - - 1.68 1.45
RB - - - - 1.74 1.37
Phelix 2.18 2.02 3.08 2.80 1.48 1.43
ENDEX 2.75 2.18 4.37 3.19 1.39 1.45
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a similar result. Furthermore, OLS estimates are also similar.11 
In Panel B, we test if the response of Brent in USD is caused by 
11 Results in the crisis period are robust to several sub-sample periods. Firstly, 
the crisis period is redefined to begin a few months after the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy to exclude the spectacular fall in oil prices and interest rates (May 
2009–March 2017). In this sub-sample, the coefficient estimation using the 
Rigobon and Sack (2004) approach for Brent in USD, Brent in EUR and 
its t-statistics between brackets are 0.20888 (2.07)** and 0.17880 (1.85)*, 
respectively. The Hausman (1978) equality test (significance level between 
brackets) cannot reject the equality between both coefficients: 0.31829 
(0.57). Alternatively, the crisis period is defined again to begin after the fall in 
oil and interest rates and finishing before interest rates fell below zero (May 
2009 – August 2014). In this case, coefficients for Brent in USD, Brent in 
EUR, and its t-statistics are: 0.23478 (2.43)** and 0.22267 (2.42)**. Again, 
the Hausman (1978) equality test cannot reject the equality between both 
coefficients: 0.05172 (0.82). Consequently, the conclusions do not change if 
the crisis period is defined differently. Asterisks are read as in Table 2.
the EUR-USD exchange rate. The response of the exchange rate 
to monetary policy actions is very small and insignificant; and 
the Hausman (1978) test rejects the equality of the response at 
any significance level and for any period. Finally, in Panel C we 
explore the alternative use of the Italian risk premium as a variable 
reflecting monetary policy action for the crisis period. We obtain 
significant results only in the event-study methodology. In this 
case, the response is negative. An increase in the risk premium 
of 100 basis points triggers a response in the Brent futures of 
−4.221%. The Wald test cannot reject the hypothesis of equal 
response of Brent in USD and EUR and rejects the hypothesis 
that Brent and EUR-USD responses are equal.
Table 3 present a similar analysis to the previous table applied 
to the NBP natural gas futures. We find no significant response 
Table 2: Estimated effect of ECB policy announcements 
on Brent prices




Brent in USD 0.08115 (2.82)*** 0.09789 (2.16)**
Brent in EUR 0.07683 (2.63)*** 0.10259 (2.26)**
Test equality (sig.level) 0.022035 (0.88) 1.10208 (0.29)
January 1999-July 2007
Brent in USD 0.03866 (1.19) 0.05923 (0.96)
Brent in EUR 0.03674 (1.01) 0.07144 (1.13)
Test equality (sig.level) 0.00281 (0.96) 0.13268 (0.72)
August 2007-March 2017
Brent in USD 0.16042 (1.97)** 0.16216 (2.47)**
Brent in EUR 0.15160 (2.09)** 0.15438 (2.43)**
Test equality (sig.level) 0.01482 (0.90) 0.04429 (0.83)
Panel B: Brent in USD and EUR-USD exchange rate using 
interest rates as instrumental variable
Sample Event-study Rigobon-Sack
January 1999-March 2017
EUR-USD 0.00342 (0.45) −0.00397 (−0.35)
Brent in USD 0.08115 (2.81)*** 0.10259 (2.26)**
Test equality (sig.level) 102.57859 (0.00)*** 16.32740 (0.00)***
January 1999-June 2007
EUR-USD −0.00007 (−0.08) −0.01291 (−0.81)
Brent in USD 0.03866 (1.19) 0.07144 (1.13)
Test equality (sig.level) 21.75755 (0.00)*** 0.13268 (0. 03)**
July 2007-March 2017
EUR-USD 0.01111 (0.64) 0.01090 (0.68)
Brent in USD 0.16042 (1.97)** 0.15438 (2.43)**
Test equality (sig.level) 76.04879 (0.00)*** 18.42810 (0.00)***
Panel C: Rigobon-Sack estimation using the Italian risk 
premium as instrumental variable
Sample Event-study Rigobon-Sack
July 2007-March 2017
Brent in USD −0.04221 (−2.15)** −0.03151 (−0.34)
Brent in EUR −0.03084 (−1.70)* −0.03588 (−0.40)
Test equality (sig.level) 0.39584 (0.53) 0.02420 (0.98)
July 2007-March 2017
Brent in USD −0.04221 (−2.15)** −0.03151 (−0.34)
EUR-USD −0.01018 (−1.71)* 0.00887 (0.38)
Test equality (sig.level) 28.91787 (0.00)*** 0.79277 (0.43)
Table 3: Estimated effect of ECB policy announcements 
on UK natural gas prices




NBP in GBP −0.01070 (−0.39) −0.00571 (−0.09)
NBP in EUR −0.01460 (−0.45) −0.00633 (−0.10)
Test equality (sig.level) 0.01981 (0.89) 0.01624 (0.98)
January 1999-June 2007
NBP in GBP −0.01602 (−0.37) −0.01088 (−0.11)
NBP in EUR −0.01634 (−0.43) −0.00153 (−0.02)
Test equality (sig.level) 0.00001 (0.99) 0.02632 (0.87)
July 2007-March 2017
NBP in GBP −0.00005 (−0.00) 0.00289 (0.05)
NBP in EUR −0.01183 (−0.25) −0.01430 (−0.22)
Test equality (sig.level) 0.08464 (0.77) 0.18509 (0.66)
Panel B: NBP in GBP and EUR-GBP exchange rate using 
interest rates as instrumental variable
Sample Event-study Rigobon-Sack
January 1999-March 2017
NBP in GBP −0.01070 (−0.39) −0.00571 (−0.09)
EUR-GBP −0.00184 (0.25) 0.00004 (0.00)
Test equality (sig.level) 2.89160 (0.09)*** 0.03507 (0.85)
January 1999-June 2007
NBP in GBP −0.01634 (−0.43) −001188 (−0.11)
EUR-GBP −0.00341 (−0.39) −0.01180 (−0.90)
Test equality (sig.level) 2.14330 (0.14) 0.00032 (0.98)
July 2007-March 2017
NBP in GBP −0.00005 (−0.00) 0.00289 (0.05)
EUR-GBP 0.01163 (0.81) 0.01973 (1.39)
Test equality (sig.level) 0.66837 (0.41) 0.34513 (0.55)
Panel C: Rigobon-Sack estimation using the Italian risk 
premium as instrumental variable
Sample Event-study Rigobon-Sack
July 2007-March 2017
NBP in GBP 0.03912 (1.88)*** 0.16405 (1.56)
NBP in EUR 0.02855 (1.57) 0.17696 (1.62)
Test equality (sig.level) 0.33859 (0.56) 0.00238 (0.96)
July 2007-March 2017
NBP in GBP 0.02855 (1.57) 0.16405 (1.56)
EUR-GBP −0.01052 (−2.24)** −0.01758 (−0.90)
Test equality (sig.level) 69.04427 (0.00)*** 13.24677 (0.00)***
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using the Rigobon and Sack (2004) method. With the event-study 
method, we obtain some significant and positive response to ECB 
monetary surprises measured with the Italian risk premium for the 
crisis period – but we obtain no conclusion about this commodity.
Finally, Table 4 presents the results for the remaining European 
energy commodities. We obtain only significant results for coal 
(ARA and RB futures contracts). For the crisis period and using 
the interest rates as instrumental variables we obtain a significant 
and positive response whose size is similar to the response of the 
Brent case. Any further explanation for the coal case would require 
further research that we do not investigate in the present study.
The estimated responses of energy prices under the 
heteroscedasticity-based method are always larger than the 
corresponding estimates under the event-study approach when 
both coefficients are significant. The difference likely reflects 
the bias in the event-study estimates. The equality between both 
coefficients has been tested using the Hausman (1978) test. The 
test results, not reported to save space, show that the equality 
hypothesis between the estimated coefficients is accepted in almost 
all cases. There are only three exceptions in which this hypothesis 
is not accepted at 5% of significance level. Specifically, for NBP 
in EUR in Panel C in Table 3, and ARA and RB coal in Table 4 
when interest rates are used as instrument variable. The differences 
between coefficient values suggest that other types of news are 
also present on those days. If this is true, the heteroscedasticity 
based estimation will provide a more accurate measure of the 
energy price response to monetary policy shocks.
In Rogers et al. (2014), it is found that during the financial crisis 
period, the euro exchange rate had a contrarian behaviour to the 
dollar, yen and sterling pound. Unexpected expansionary monetary 
policy actions by the ECB lead to an appreciation of the euro – 
contrary to economic intuition and to what was happening in the 
US, UK and Japan. We do not find any significant EUR-USD 
exchange rate response to policy shocks measured as interest rates, 
and consequently, oil price response seems not to be caused by 
exchange rate response. When the Italian risk premium is used as 
a measure of policy shocks, we find some evidence on Panel C in 
Table II and Panel C in Table III that the exchange rate inversely 
responds to unexpected monetary shocks measured with the 
Italian risk premium, but the Hausman (1978) test rejects equality 
between the commodity and exchange rate response.
Estimation of the Equation 1 coefficient is reported. The event-
study methodology estimates the coefficient using OLS estimation 
with t-statistics, between brackets, computed with the Newey-West 
consistent estimators. The Rigobon-Sack estimation method is 
described in Section 2. In the equality test, the Hausman (1978) 
method is applied in the Rigobon and Sack method and the Wald 
test is applied in the event-study method. Significance of the 
coefficients at the 1%, 5% and 10% or p-values in the equality 
tests below 1%, 5% and 10% are indicated with one (*), two (**) 
and three (***) asterisks, respectively.
Comments are identical to those of Table 2 and 3
5. CONCLUSIONS
There are many studies on how asset prices respond to monetary 
policy actions. The general agreement is that asset returns 
respond negatively to short-term interest rate returns reflecting the 
monetary policy stance. Studies on the commodity price response 
to monetary policy surprises in the US depict a similar pattern for 
the remaining financial assets, especially in the last decade. This 
result is obtained for all the periods and for all financial areas, but 
with an exception: The Eurozone in the financial crisis. European 
financial assets during the crisis period responded positively to 
expansionary conventional and unconventional ECB monetary 
policies. The present study tries to cover the existing void in similar 
studies applied to the EU and its energy commodities.
Using the Rigobon and Sack (2003) identification through the 
heteroscedasticity method, we find only a significant and positive 
Table 4: Estimated effect of ECB policy announcements on Eurozone energy commodities
Commodity Sample Event-study Rigobon-Sack Instrument
TTF January 2004-March 2017 −0.02797 (−0.50) −0.02650 (−0.29) Interest rates
TTF January 2004-July 2007 −0.21188 (−0.59) 0.10551 (0.13) Interest rates
TTF July 2007-March 2017 −0.01848 (−0.42) −0.03242 (−0.51) Interest rates
TTF July 2007-March 2017 0.03369 (2.05)** 0.14813 (1.44) Italian risk premium
EUA June 2005-March 2017 0.02804 (0.29) 0.05661 (0.42) Interest rates
EUA June 2005-June 2007 0.18124 (0.24) 0.85548 (0.76) Interest rates
EUA July 2007-March 2017 0.01968 (0.26) 0.02526 (0.21) Interest rates
EUA July 2007-March 2017 0.03496 (1.57) 0.18217 (1.02) Italian risk premium
ARA July 2007-March 2017 0.08959 (2.29)**  0.14993 (3.15)*** Interest rates
ARA July 2007-March 2017 −0.00192 (−0.19) 0.04995 (0.73) Italian risk premium
RB July 2007-March 2017 0.10081 (3.54)*** 0.14662 (3.13)*** Interest rates
RB July 2007-March 2017 −0.01393 (−1.14) −0.03429 (−0.53) Italian risk premium
Phelix July 2002-March 2017 0.02058 (0.50) 0.01016 (0.17) Interest rates
Phelix July 2002-June 2007 0.11951 (0.69) 0.23491 (0.86) Interest rates
Phelix July 2007-March 2017 0.00707 (0.22) −0.01586 (−0.37) Interest rates
Phelix July 2007-March 2017 0.02524 (2.01)** 0.08477 (1.31) Italian risk premium
Endex January 2003-March 2017 −0.00255 (−0.05) −0.02382 (−0.33) Interest rates
Endex January 2003-June 2007 −0.12107 (−0.51) −0.21585 (−0.42) Interest rates
Endex July 2007-March 2017 0.00606 (0.19) −0.01053 (−0.25) Interest rates
Endex July 2007-March 2017 0.01638 (1.27) 0.05153 (0.87) Italian risk premium
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response during the crisis period for Brent and coal. This result 
reinforces the idea that during this period of time, financial assets 
(and some commodities) positively responded to expansionary 
conventional and unconventional monetary policy measures, 
increasing confidence in the survival of the European monetary 
union. The remaining European energy commodities (electricity, 
EUAs and natural gas prices) seem unaffected by monetary policy 
actions, both during and before the crisis. We believe these results 
are of interest to financial agents and institutions, and are especially 
important for the ECB when predicting the consequences of its 
monetary policy on the inflation objective.
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